Employment Law Advisory Bulletin Winter
2000
Special California Law Issue
CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH EMPLOYER ON TWO KEY ISSUES
By DWT's
California Employment Lawyers
Employers obtained a significant victory
in a recent ruling by the California Supreme Court, Guz v. Bechtel
National, Inc.
The case concerned a 22-year employee who was terminated allegedly
due to a downturn in workload. The employee sued his employer for
breach of an implied contract that he would be terminated only for
cause and age discrimination. California employers should take note
of this decision for two reasons:
First, Guz establishes unequivocally that long tenure and
a history of raises, promotions, and good reviews do not create
by themselves an implied contract that the employer can terminate
an employee only for cause. The decision reverses a series of appellate
decisions to the contrary on this issue. In reaching its decision,
the California Supreme Court placed great weight on the employer's
written policy distributed to its employees providing that there
was no guarantee of continued employment. The Court's reliance on
this written policy as being a clear expression of the parties'
intent is further reason why employers should distribute written
at-will policies to their employees.
The Guz decision has also established that - at least under
state law - an employee must have more than just minimal evidence
of age discrimination to merit a trial. The California Supreme Court
interpreted a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., in a pro-employer fashion. It held that
an employer can avoid trial where an employee has presented so little
evidence that no reasonable jury could conclude the employer's actions
are discriminatory. Employees looking for a more favorable interpretation
of age discrimination laws may, in light of this pro-employer state
decision, choose to proceed in federal court under federal laws
where it appears that the courts might be more willing to allow
the case to proceed to trial. Ironically, federal court, which has
historically been more favored by employers, may no longer be the
best venue for employers to resolve age discrimination cases in
California as a result of Guz.
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT APPROVES MANDATORY
ARBITRATION
By
Stuart Miller
Many California employers have required newly hired and current
employees to sign agreements obligating employees to arbitrate employment
claims rather than file lawsuits. In Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc., the California Supreme Court
recently held that such agreements are enforceable if they satisfy
certain conditions, most of which assure that the agreements not
favor the employer to the employee's detriment.
First, the arbitration agreement must afford an employee the full
range of statutory remedies, including punitive damages and attorneys'
fees recoverable under the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act (FEHA).
Second, the employer alone must "pay all types of costs that are
unique to arbitration." This means that if the arbitrator charges
an hourly or daily fee, it may not be split by the parties but must
be paid exclusively by the employer. The Court noted that in litigation,
employees do not have to pay for the services of a judge. The Court
reasoned that requiring the employer to pay the arbitrator's fee
"will ensure that employees bringing FEHA claims will not be deterred
by costs greater than the usual costs incurred during litigation.
Moreover, the above rule is fair, inasmuch as it places the cost
of arbitration on the party that imposes it."
Third, employees are "entitled to discovery sufficient to adequately
arbitrate their statutory claim, including access to essential documents
and witnesses, as determined by the arbitrator(s) and subject to
limited judicial review pursuant to" the Code of Civil Procedure.
The Court did not precisely define what represents "sufficient"
discovery, but stated that the arbitrator should balance the "desirable
simplicity" of arbitration with the requirements of FEHA. Employers
may want to specify in an arbitration clause the pre-hearing discovery
that would be available for both sides.
Fourth, in order for judicial review of the arbitrator's decision
"to be successfully accomplished, an arbitrator in a FEHA case must
issue a written arbitration decision that will reveal, however briefly,
the essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based."
As such, the arbitration clause or agreement should require a written
opinion by the arbitrator.
Fifth, the employer and the employee both must be obligated "to
arbitrate all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence
or series of transactions or occurrences," such as all claims arising
out of an alleged wrongful termination. The Court did not completely
rule out unilateral arbitration agreements, stating that there must
be "at least some reasonable justification for such one-sidedness
based on 'business realities.'" The Court did not explain what those
realities could be.
This requirement may make arbitration less attractive in certain
industries. For example, in high technology industries, it is important
for employers to preserve their right to seek injunctive relief
in court, including a temporary restraining order (TRO), against
current and former employees who steal and misuse trade secrets.
Before this ruling, many arbitration agreements stated that the
employer had the right to seek injunctive relief. The Court
did not squarely address such a provision as an additional basis
for invalidating the agreement in this case. However, the arbitration
agreement rejected in this case did require an employee who was
terminated for stealing trade secrets to arbitrate wrongful termination
claims and enabled the employer to pursue its claim for theft of
trade secrets in court.
Logically, "business realities" should entitle an employer who
is experiencing immediate and irreparable harm because of an employee's
disclosure or misuse of trade secrets, to obtain a TRO and preliminary
injunction in court and then pursue other remedies in arbitration.
However, to be safe, consideration should be given to including
a provision in the arbitration agreement enabling both parties to
seek injunctive relief, but otherwise requiring arbitration of employment-related
claims. Such a provision should be enforceable because it is bilateral.
An employer will not likely be harmed by a bilateral injunctive
provision as there is very little conceivable need for an employee
to seek an injunction against an employer.
The Supreme Court in Armendariz also addressed the issue
of whether the unlawful provisions in that employer's particular
arbitration agreement could be stricken and the rest of the agreement
enforced. The Court refused to do so for two reasons. First, because
the agreement had multiple defects ("an unlawful damages provision
and an unconscionably unilateral arbitration clause"), the Court
concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
concluding that the agreement "is permeated by an unlawful purpose."
Second, the Court asserted that there was no single provision that
could be stricken or restricted in order to remedy the agreement.
Rather, a court would have to augment that agreement with additional
terms, which is not authorized by the applicable statutes.
Complicating the picture is that a three judge panel of the federal
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (which includes all California federal
district courts) ruled in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.
(1998) that employees may not be required, as a condition of employment,
to waive their right to file in court claims for employment discrimination
under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and under
FEHA. Armendariz rejected the reasoning and ruling of Duffield,
as have other federal courts. Armendariz described the Duffield
decision as "a minority of one." Pending resolution of the issue
by the U.S. Supreme Court, employees seeking to avoid enforcement
of individual arbitration agreements can be expected to file suit
under Title VII in federal court.
Employers who have employment arbitration agreements in place
should have those agreements reviewed by employment counsel to ensure
that they comply with Armendariz. If the agreements have
multiple defects, it may be necessary to enter into new agreements
with employees. Current employees who are presented with updated
arbitration agreements should be given some new consideration in
exchange for their signature, such as cash. Employers who contemplate
having applicants and/or current employees sign mandatory arbitration
agreements should evaluate the pros and cons of such agreements.
Arbitration is not a cure-all for employers. For example, many arbitrators
have a tendency to "split the baby" in resolving disputes, as it
is in their economic interest to attract ongoing customers by having
no winner or loser. Consequently, carefully researching potential
arbitrators is absolutely critical. Also, now employers will have
to pay the full fee of arbitrators which could diminish the savings
realized by arbitration.
NEW
CALIFORNIA WAGE LAWS BENEFIT HEALTH CARE AND SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES
By DWT's
California Employment Lawyers
California employers have obtained limited relief from onerous
overtime requirements as a result of new laws recognizing additional
exemptions for certain computer software and nursing professionals.
Background
Federal and state law both address whether employers must pay
overtime wages to their employees or whether an employee is "exempt"
from overtime pay. Historically, California employers have focused
on California law as the state overtime laws tended to be more protective
of employees than federal law.
This has been especially true since the beginning of this year
when daily overtime again became California law. Unlike federal
law that requires overtime pay for non-exempt employees after 40
hours in a week, California law now requires employers to compensate
all non-exempt employees at an overtime rate or all hours worked
in excess of eight in a day, as well as forty in a week. Daily overtime
has proved to be very expensive, especially in the health care and
software industries, where highly compensated employees have not
met the state requirements for an overtime exemption.
Despite daily overtime, California law still recognizes overtime
exemptions for administrative, managerial and professional employees
who spend more than half of their time engaged in exempt work. However,
to meet the exemption the employees must be paid on a salaried basis
and receive no less than the equivalent of twice the minimum wage
based upon a 40 hour week. Most nurses and software professionals
did not qualify for the exemption either because they were paid
on an hourly basis or their duties were not viewed as being exempt
duties recognized under the three categories of exemption (the regulations
defining the professional exemption specifically excluded nurses).
The legislation enacted in September - and effective immediately
-- expands the professional exemption category to specifically include
highly compensated computer software professionals and three types
of certified nurses.
Computer Software Professionals
Employers no longer must pay hourly overtime rates (one and a half
time regular rate for hours in excess of eight and up to twelve
or double for hours exceeding twelve) to computer software professionals
earning at least $41 per hour who spend more than half their time
engaged in intellectual or creative work that requires the exercise
of discretion and independent judgment. Thus, to qualify, such employees
can be paid on an hourly as opposed to a salary basis. Until now
no statute or regulation clearly explained what would be deemed
"intellectual or creative work" in the computer software profession.
The new law now provides improved guidance, noting the following
as exempt type duties:
- applying system analysis techniques;
- designing, developing, documenting, analyzing,
creating, testing or modifying computer systems or programs; or
- documenting, testing, creating or modifying
computer programs related to the design of software or hardware
for computer hardware systems.
In addition, the employee must be highly skilled and proficient
in computer systems analysis, programming and software engineering.
The exemption does not apply to employees who merely
operate, manufacture, repair or maintain computer hardware, or to
trainees or those at an entry level who require close supervision.
Nurses
California law now recognizes limited professional exemptions in
the nursing fields. The three categories that now meet the professional
exemption are:
(1) certified nurse midwives;
(2) certified nurse anesthetists; and
(3) certified nurse practitioners.
As with all professional exempt employees (except computer professionals),
these nurses will need to be paid on a salary basis at the monthly
equivalent of at least twice the minimum wage based upon a 40 hour
week.
Risks
With these new enactments clarifying exempt categories, employers
should expect greater enforcement efforts by the Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement and heightened awareness by employees of their
exempt status. documenting, testing, creating or modifying computer
programs related to the design of software or hardware for computer
hardware systems.
In addition, the employee must be highly skilled and proficient
in computer systems analysis, programming and software engineering.
The exemption does not apply to employees who merely operate, manufacture,
repair or maintain computer hardware, or to trainees or those at
an entry level who require close supervision.
NEW
CALIFORNIA LAW RELAXES REQUIREMENTS FOR DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS
By
Stuart Miller
Disabled job applicants and employees may pursue claims for disability
discrimination and for failure to reasonably accommodate their disabilities
under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). California Assembly
Bill (AB) 2222, which Governor Davis signed on September 30, 2000
and which takes effect on January 1, 2001, makes it substantially
easier to pursue such claims under FEHA than under the ADA. Key
changes created by AB 2222 are addressed below.
Mitigating Measures
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999),
the United States Supreme Court ruled that, under the federal ADA,
the determination of whether an individual is "disabled" and therefore
entitled to pursue a cause of action, should be made after taking
account of measures, such as eyeglasses and contact lenses, that
mitigate the person's impairment. That decision was a major defeat
for the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
which advocated the opposite position.
AB 2222 explicitly rejects that holding of Sutton with regard to
the California FEHA. AB 2222 states that the issue of whether a
person has a mental or physical disability under FEHA "shall be
determined without regard to mitigating measures, such as medications,
assistive devices, or reasonable accommodations, unless the mitigating
measure itself limits a major life activity." Consequently, a seriously
myopic person, whose vision is 20-20 with contact lenses, is nevertheless
"disabled" for purposes of FEHA but not under the ADA.
"Limits" Versus "Substantially Limits" a Major Life Activity
The ADA defines a "disability" as including "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities."
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Although the word "substantially" does
not appear in the definition of disability under FEHA, one district
of the California Court of Appeal has held that the state language
should be interpreted in the same way as the federal requirement.
Several other districts have disagreed with respect to mental impairments
under FEHA.
AB 2222 resolves the dispute by declaring that "the definitions
of 'physical disability' and 'mental disability' under the laws
of this state require a 'limitation' upon a major life activity
but do not require as does the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, a 'substantial limitation.' This distinction is intended to
result in broader coverage under the law of this state than under
the federal act." AB 2222 further provides that "A mental or psychological
disorder or condition limits a major life activity if it makes the
achievement of the major life activity difficult." Similarly, AB
2222 states that "A physiological disease, disorder, condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss limits a major life activity
if it makes the achievement of the major life activity difficult."
The meaning of the word "difficult" in this context will undoubtedly
be the subject of much litigation.
"Working" as a "Major Life Activity"
"Working" is one of the "major life activities" addressed by the
ADA and FEHA. In Sutton v. United Air Lines, the U. S. Supreme
Court explained that, under the ADA, "When the major life activity
under consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase 'substantially
limits' requires, at minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable
to work in a broad class of jobs." For example, a police officer
arguably would not be "disabled" if the officer could work as a
patrol officer in a car, but due to allergies was unable to serve
as a mounted police officer on a horse. The Court cited the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's regulation stating that the
individual must be "significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.
The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute
a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working."
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). In Hobson v. Raychem, the California
Court of Appeal noted last year that "all California courts which
have interpreted the FEHA, have uniformly" reached that conclusion.
That is no longer the law under FEHA. AB 2222 provides that "under
the law of this state, 'working' is a major life activity, regardless
of whether the actual or perceived working limitation implicates
a particular employment or a class or broad range of employments."
In other words, a person will now be considered "disabled" under
FEHA because of a physical or mental condition which makes it "difficult"
for that person to perform only one particular job out of tens of
thousands of types of jobs.
FEHA (and the ADA) defines "disability" as either (a) having the
disability or (b) "being regarded" by the employer (accurately or
not) as disabled or (c) having a record of such an impairment. Numerous
federal court opinions under the ADA have held that a "regarded
as" claim cannot survive unless the employer regarded the employee
or applicant as substantially limited in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.
However, as a result of AB 2222, being regarded by the employer
as limited in the ability to perform one single job is now sufficient
under FEHA to be a "disabled" person.
AB 2222 confirms what is already well known among human resource
professionals and employment law specialists: that FEHA and the
ADA are traps for unwary and well meaning employers. Rather than
rely on common sense, which may be at odds with the law, employers
should seek professional advice before making significant decisions
relating to "disabled" applicants and employees.
HEADS
UP ON MINIMUM WAGE HIKE
By DWT's
California Employment Lawyers
The minimum wage in California will increase as of January 1, 2001
by fifty (50) cents. This means that all employees must be paid
no less than $6.25 per hour. It also means that for purposes of
qualifying for administrative, executive and professional exemptions
employees must be paid a salary of no less than $26,000 per year.
Who Should You Contact for California Employment Law Issues?
California employers who need assistance on any employment law
issue should contact Emilio Gonzalez in the firm's Los Angeles office
at emiliogonzales@dwt.com
or (213) 633-6829 or Stu Miller in the firm's San Francisco office
at stuartmiller@dwt.com
or (415) 276-6584.
Stu Miller
is a partner in DWT's San Francisco office. He has 20 years
of experience advising employers in all areas of employment and
labor law and has successfully litigated well over a hundred employment
related lawsuits on behalf of large and small employers in a wide
range of industries.
Emilio
Gonzales is an associate in DWT's Los Angeles office.
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