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Employment Law Advisory Bulletin Winter 2000
Special California Law Issue



CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH EMPLOYER ON TWO KEY ISSUES
By DWT's California Employment Lawyers

Employers obtained a significant victory in a recent ruling by the California Supreme Court, Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.

The case concerned a 22-year employee who was terminated allegedly due to a downturn in workload. The employee sued his employer for breach of an implied contract that he would be terminated only for cause and age discrimination. California employers should take note of this decision for two reasons:

First, Guz establishes unequivocally that long tenure and a history of raises, promotions, and good reviews do not create by themselves an implied contract that the employer can terminate an employee only for cause. The decision reverses a series of appellate decisions to the contrary on this issue. In reaching its decision, the California Supreme Court placed great weight on the employer's written policy distributed to its employees providing that there was no guarantee of continued employment. The Court's reliance on this written policy as being a clear expression of the parties' intent is further reason why employers should distribute written at-will policies to their employees.

The Guz decision has also established that - at least under state law - an employee must have more than just minimal evidence of age discrimination to merit a trial. The California Supreme Court interpreted a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., in a pro-employer fashion. It held that an employer can avoid trial where an employee has presented so little evidence that no reasonable jury could conclude the employer's actions are discriminatory. Employees looking for a more favorable interpretation of age discrimination laws may, in light of this pro-employer state decision, choose to proceed in federal court under federal laws where it appears that the courts might be more willing to allow the case to proceed to trial. Ironically, federal court, which has historically been more favored by employers, may no longer be the best venue for employers to resolve age discrimination cases in California as a result of Guz.

 

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT APPROVES MANDATORY ARBITRATION
By Stuart Miller

Many California employers have required newly hired and current employees to sign agreements obligating employees to arbitrate employment claims rather than file lawsuits. In Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., the California Supreme Court recently held that such agreements are enforceable if they satisfy certain conditions, most of which assure that the agreements not favor the employer to the employee's detriment.

First, the arbitration agreement must afford an employee the full range of statutory remedies, including punitive damages and attorneys' fees recoverable under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).

Second, the employer alone must "pay all types of costs that are unique to arbitration." This means that if the arbitrator charges an hourly or daily fee, it may not be split by the parties but must be paid exclusively by the employer. The Court noted that in litigation, employees do not have to pay for the services of a judge. The Court reasoned that requiring the employer to pay the arbitrator's fee "will ensure that employees bringing FEHA claims will not be deterred by costs greater than the usual costs incurred during litigation. Moreover, the above rule is fair, inasmuch as it places the cost of arbitration on the party that imposes it."

Third, employees are "entitled to discovery sufficient to adequately arbitrate their statutory claim, including access to essential documents and witnesses, as determined by the arbitrator(s) and subject to limited judicial review pursuant to" the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court did not precisely define what represents "sufficient" discovery, but stated that the arbitrator should balance the "desirable simplicity" of arbitration with the requirements of FEHA. Employers may want to specify in an arbitration clause the pre-hearing discovery that would be available for both sides.

Fourth, in order for judicial review of the arbitrator's decision "to be successfully accomplished, an arbitrator in a FEHA case must issue a written arbitration decision that will reveal, however briefly, the essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based." As such, the arbitration clause or agreement should require a written opinion by the arbitrator.

Fifth, the employer and the employee both must be obligated "to arbitrate all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences," such as all claims arising out of an alleged wrongful termination. The Court did not completely rule out unilateral arbitration agreements, stating that there must be "at least some reasonable justification for such one-sidedness based on 'business realities.'" The Court did not explain what those realities could be.

This requirement may make arbitration less attractive in certain industries. For example, in high technology industries, it is important for employers to preserve their right to seek injunctive relief in court, including a temporary restraining order (TRO), against current and former employees who steal and misuse trade secrets. Before this ruling, many arbitration agreements stated that the employer had the right to seek injunctive relief. The Court did not squarely address such a provision as an additional basis for invalidating the agreement in this case. However, the arbitration agreement rejected in this case did require an employee who was terminated for stealing trade secrets to arbitrate wrongful termination claims and enabled the employer to pursue its claim for theft of trade secrets in court.

Logically, "business realities" should entitle an employer who is experiencing immediate and irreparable harm because of an employee's disclosure or misuse of trade secrets, to obtain a TRO and preliminary injunction in court and then pursue other remedies in arbitration. However, to be safe, consideration should be given to including a provision in the arbitration agreement enabling both parties to seek injunctive relief, but otherwise requiring arbitration of employment-related claims. Such a provision should be enforceable because it is bilateral. An employer will not likely be harmed by a bilateral injunctive provision as there is very little conceivable need for an employee to seek an injunction against an employer.

The Supreme Court in Armendariz also addressed the issue of whether the unlawful provisions in that employer's particular arbitration agreement could be stricken and the rest of the agreement enforced. The Court refused to do so for two reasons. First, because the agreement had multiple defects ("an unlawful damages provision and an unconscionably unilateral arbitration clause"), the Court concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in concluding that the agreement "is permeated by an unlawful purpose." Second, the Court asserted that there was no single provision that could be stricken or restricted in order to remedy the agreement. Rather, a court would have to augment that agreement with additional terms, which is not authorized by the applicable statutes.

Complicating the picture is that a three judge panel of the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (which includes all California federal district courts) ruled in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co. (1998) that employees may not be required, as a condition of employment, to waive their right to file in court claims for employment discrimination under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and under FEHA. Armendariz rejected the reasoning and ruling of Duffield, as have other federal courts. Armendariz described the Duffield decision as "a minority of one." Pending resolution of the issue by the U.S. Supreme Court, employees seeking to avoid enforcement of individual arbitration agreements can be expected to file suit under Title VII in federal court.

Employers who have employment arbitration agreements in place should have those agreements reviewed by employment counsel to ensure that they comply with Armendariz. If the agreements have multiple defects, it may be necessary to enter into new agreements with employees. Current employees who are presented with updated arbitration agreements should be given some new consideration in exchange for their signature, such as cash. Employers who contemplate having applicants and/or current employees sign mandatory arbitration agreements should evaluate the pros and cons of such agreements. Arbitration is not a cure-all for employers. For example, many arbitrators have a tendency to "split the baby" in resolving disputes, as it is in their economic interest to attract ongoing customers by having no winner or loser. Consequently, carefully researching potential arbitrators is absolutely critical. Also, now employers will have to pay the full fee of arbitrators which could diminish the savings realized by arbitration.

 

NEW CALIFORNIA WAGE LAWS BENEFIT HEALTH CARE AND SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES
By DWT's California Employment Lawyers

California employers have obtained limited relief from onerous overtime requirements as a result of new laws recognizing additional exemptions for certain computer software and nursing professionals.

Background

Federal and state law both address whether employers must pay overtime wages to their employees or whether an employee is "exempt" from overtime pay. Historically, California employers have focused on California law as the state overtime laws tended to be more protective of employees than federal law.

This has been especially true since the beginning of this year when daily overtime again became California law. Unlike federal law that requires overtime pay for non-exempt employees after 40 hours in a week, California law now requires employers to compensate all non-exempt employees at an overtime rate or all hours worked in excess of eight in a day, as well as forty in a week. Daily overtime has proved to be very expensive, especially in the health care and software industries, where highly compensated employees have not met the state requirements for an overtime exemption.

Despite daily overtime, California law still recognizes overtime exemptions for administrative, managerial and professional employees who spend more than half of their time engaged in exempt work. However, to meet the exemption the employees must be paid on a salaried basis and receive no less than the equivalent of twice the minimum wage based upon a 40 hour week. Most nurses and software professionals did not qualify for the exemption either because they were paid on an hourly basis or their duties were not viewed as being exempt duties recognized under the three categories of exemption (the regulations defining the professional exemption specifically excluded nurses).

The legislation enacted in September - and effective immediately -- expands the professional exemption category to specifically include highly compensated computer software professionals and three types of certified nurses.

Computer Software Professionals

Employers no longer must pay hourly overtime rates (one and a half time regular rate for hours in excess of eight and up to twelve or double for hours exceeding twelve) to computer software professionals earning at least $41 per hour who spend more than half their time engaged in intellectual or creative work that requires the exercise of discretion and independent judgment. Thus, to qualify, such employees can be paid on an hourly as opposed to a salary basis. Until now no statute or regulation clearly explained what would be deemed "intellectual or creative work" in the computer software profession. The new law now provides improved guidance, noting the following as exempt type duties:

  • applying system analysis techniques;
  • designing, developing, documenting, analyzing, creating, testing or modifying computer systems or programs; or
  • documenting, testing, creating or modifying computer programs related to the design of software or hardware for computer hardware systems.

In addition, the employee must be highly skilled and proficient in computer systems analysis, programming and software engineering.

The exemption does not apply to employees who merely operate, manufacture, repair or maintain computer hardware, or to trainees or those at an entry level who require close supervision.

Nurses

California law now recognizes limited professional exemptions in the nursing fields. The three categories that now meet the professional exemption are:

(1) certified nurse midwives;

(2) certified nurse anesthetists; and

(3) certified nurse practitioners.

As with all professional exempt employees (except computer professionals), these nurses will need to be paid on a salary basis at the monthly equivalent of at least twice the minimum wage based upon a 40 hour week.

Risks

With these new enactments clarifying exempt categories, employers should expect greater enforcement efforts by the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement and heightened awareness by employees of their exempt status. documenting, testing, creating or modifying computer programs related to the design of software or hardware for computer hardware systems.

In addition, the employee must be highly skilled and proficient in computer systems analysis, programming and software engineering.

The exemption does not apply to employees who merely operate, manufacture, repair or maintain computer hardware, or to trainees or those at an entry level who require close supervision.

 

NEW CALIFORNIA LAW RELAXES REQUIREMENTS FOR DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
By Stuart Miller

Disabled job applicants and employees may pursue claims for disability discrimination and for failure to reasonably accommodate their disabilities under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). California Assembly Bill (AB) 2222, which Governor Davis signed on September 30, 2000 and which takes effect on January 1, 2001, makes it substantially easier to pursue such claims under FEHA than under the ADA. Key changes created by AB 2222 are addressed below.

Mitigating Measures

In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), the United States Supreme Court ruled that, under the federal ADA, the determination of whether an individual is "disabled" and therefore entitled to pursue a cause of action, should be made after taking account of measures, such as eyeglasses and contact lenses, that mitigate the person's impairment. That decision was a major defeat for the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which advocated the opposite position.

AB 2222 explicitly rejects that holding of Sutton with regard to the California FEHA. AB 2222 states that the issue of whether a person has a mental or physical disability under FEHA "shall be determined without regard to mitigating measures, such as medications, assistive devices, or reasonable accommodations, unless the mitigating measure itself limits a major life activity." Consequently, a seriously myopic person, whose vision is 20-20 with contact lenses, is nevertheless "disabled" for purposes of FEHA but not under the ADA.

"Limits" Versus "Substantially Limits" a Major Life Activity

The ADA defines a "disability" as including "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Although the word "substantially" does not appear in the definition of disability under FEHA, one district of the California Court of Appeal has held that the state language should be interpreted in the same way as the federal requirement. Several other districts have disagreed with respect to mental impairments under FEHA.

AB 2222 resolves the dispute by declaring that "the definitions of 'physical disability' and 'mental disability' under the laws of this state require a 'limitation' upon a major life activity but do not require as does the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, a 'substantial limitation.' This distinction is intended to result in broader coverage under the law of this state than under the federal act." AB 2222 further provides that "A mental or psychological disorder or condition limits a major life activity if it makes the achievement of the major life activity difficult." Similarly, AB 2222 states that "A physiological disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss limits a major life activity if it makes the achievement of the major life activity difficult." The meaning of the word "difficult" in this context will undoubtedly be the subject of much litigation.

"Working" as a "Major Life Activity"

"Working" is one of the "major life activities" addressed by the ADA and FEHA. In Sutton v. United Air Lines, the U. S. Supreme Court explained that, under the ADA, "When the major life activity under consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase 'substantially limits' requires, at minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs." For example, a police officer arguably would not be "disabled" if the officer could work as a patrol officer in a car, but due to allergies was unable to serve as a mounted police officer on a horse. The Court cited the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulation stating that the individual must be "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). In Hobson v. Raychem, the California Court of Appeal noted last year that "all California courts which have interpreted the FEHA, have uniformly" reached that conclusion.

That is no longer the law under FEHA. AB 2222 provides that "under the law of this state, 'working' is a major life activity, regardless of whether the actual or perceived working limitation implicates a particular employment or a class or broad range of employments." In other words, a person will now be considered "disabled" under FEHA because of a physical or mental condition which makes it "difficult" for that person to perform only one particular job out of tens of thousands of types of jobs.

FEHA (and the ADA) defines "disability" as either (a) having the disability or (b) "being regarded" by the employer (accurately or not) as disabled or (c) having a record of such an impairment. Numerous federal court opinions under the ADA have held that a "regarded as" claim cannot survive unless the employer regarded the employee or applicant as substantially limited in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. However, as a result of AB 2222, being regarded by the employer as limited in the ability to perform one single job is now sufficient under FEHA to be a "disabled" person.

AB 2222 confirms what is already well known among human resource professionals and employment law specialists: that FEHA and the ADA are traps for unwary and well meaning employers. Rather than rely on common sense, which may be at odds with the law, employers should seek professional advice before making significant decisions relating to "disabled" applicants and employees.

 

HEADS UP ON MINIMUM WAGE HIKE
By DWT's California Employment Lawyers

The minimum wage in California will increase as of January 1, 2001 by fifty (50) cents. This means that all employees must be paid no less than $6.25 per hour. It also means that for purposes of qualifying for administrative, executive and professional exemptions employees must be paid a salary of no less than $26,000 per year.

 

Who Should You Contact for California Employment Law Issues?

California employers who need assistance on any employment law issue should contact Emilio Gonzalez in the firm's Los Angeles office at emiliogonzales@dwt.com or (213) 633-6829 or Stu Miller in the firm's San Francisco office at stuartmiller@dwt.com or (415) 276-6584.

Stu Miller is a partner in DWT's San Francisco office. He has 20 years of experience advising employers in all areas of employment and labor law and has successfully litigated well over a hundred employment related lawsuits on behalf of large and small employers in a wide range of industries.

Emilio Gonzales is an associate in DWT's Los Angeles office.

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