Redefining
Privacy in California? The "Anti-Paparazzi" Legislation
By Kelli
L. Sager
The death of Princess Diana in 1997 resulted
in widespread calls for legislation to restrain the so-called "paparazzi."
As a result of heavy lobbying by a coalition of celebrities, the
Screen Actors Guild, and victims' rights groups, California has
enacted the nation's first "anti-paparazzi" law, which creates tort
liability for "physical" and "constructive" invasions of privacy
through photographing, videotaping, or recording a person engaging
in a "personal or familial activity."1
Notwithstanding the
"anti-paparazzi" nomenclature, the legislation broadly applies to
all members of the media and has potentially far-reaching implications
for mainstream photojournalists. In addition, the poorly drafted
language in California's statute opens a Pandora's box of issues
that may take years to sort out.
The "New" Privacy Torts?
California's anti-paparazzi
law purports to create two new privacy torts: "physical invasion
of privacy" and "constructive invasion of privacy." But in many
ways the new law is duplicative of existing California law. Much
of the conduct that appears to be prohibited by the anti-paparazzi
law already was prohibited by existing California law. For example,
California has long recognized trespass as a tort. Thus, even before
the anti-paparazzi statute was passed, any person-not just a celebrity-could
sue a photojournalist or other member of the media for entering
his or her private property without permission.2
Similarly, existing California law already recognized the tort of
intrusion. Privacy is an "inalienable right" under the California
Constitution, and courts already allowed lawsuits to proceed under
various theories for invasion of that right.3
Other existing protections against claimed "abuses" by the media
include statutory and common law prohibitions against assault, battery,
false imprisonment, stalking, and surreptitious audio or video recording
of "confidential communications."4
In light of this
previously-existing law, the statute's first "new" tort, for "physical
invasion of privacy," does not appear on its face to broaden prohibited
conduct. Under the statute, a person may sue for "physical invasion
of privacy" when (1) a person has knowingly entered the land of
another without permission; (2) the entry was made with the "intent
to capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical
impression" of another person engaging in a "personal or familial
activity"; and (3) the invasion was made "in a manner that is offensive
to a reasonable person."5
Because the physical intrusion onto another person's private property
already constitutes trespass, this part of the statute arguably
does not encompass conduct that otherwise would have been permissible.
The limitations of the statute, however,
are unclear. For example, "personal or familial activity" is broadly
defined by the statute to include, but is not limited to,
the "intimate details" of the person's personal life, "interactions"
with the person's family or significant others, and "other aspects"
of the person's private affairs or concerns.6
It is unclear what conduct is or is not included under this definition.
Does "interaction with significant others" include sexual harassment
of a staff member? Or the conduct of a public official who uses
illegal drugs or physically or verbally abuses a spouse or child?
The courts will have to sort out these questions and many others
regarding the scope of what the statute prohibits.
Similarly, the statute gives no guidance
on what is meant by "offensive to a reasonable person," although
that term has been used in connection with traditional privacy intrusion
torts. For example, in public disclosure of private facts cases
a plaintiff must show (1) public disclosure (2) of a private fact
(3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable
person and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern.7
Courts have stated that the existence of "offensiveness" depends
on "the degree of intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances
surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder's motives and
objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations
of those whose privacy is invaded."8
It seems likely that a similar definition will be used for the anti-paparazzi
law.
The most significant change made by the
"physical invasion of privacy" provision of the anti-paparazzi law
is the availability of stiffer sanctions for a trespass if the purpose
of the trespass is to photograph or videotape someone. The remedies
for "physical invasion of privacy" include general damages, special
damages, treble damages (i.e., three times the general and special
damages), punitive damages, disgorgement of profits, and equitable
relief, including injunctions and restraining orders.9
Trebled damages and disgorgement of profits have not been awarded
for simple trespass, and punitive damages are very rare in such
cases.
The second "new" tort created by the anti-paparazzi
statute, for "constructive invasion of privacy" represents a potentially
significant shift in California law. The "constructive invasion"
provision goes beyond physical invasion by providing for liability
even without actual entry onto the property of another. Thus, under
certain circumstances, a photographer arguably may be held liable
under the statute for taking pictures of another, even if the photographer
has every right to be at the place where he or she takes the picture.
"Constructive invasion of privacy" occurs when (1) a person "attempts
to capture ... any type of visual image, sound recording, or other
physical impression" of another person engaging in a "personal or
familial activity"; (2) the attempt is made "in a manner that is
offensive to a reasonable person"; (3) the person photographed,
videotaped, or recorded "had a reasonable expectation of privacy";
and (4) "a visual or auditory enhancing device" is used.10
As long as the "image, sound recording, or other physical impression
could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual
or auditory enhancing device was used," it does not matter that
there was no physical trespass. Damages for "constructive invasion
of privacy" are the same as for "physical invasion of privacy."
A key element to the "constructive invasion"
provision is that the person photographed or recorded must have
had a "reasonable expectation of privacy," a phrase familiar to
the analysis of whether police searches are constitutional under
the Fourth Amendment. If the principles developed under Fourth Amendment
analysis are applied to the anti-paparazzi law, photojournalists
should have some guidance and protection. Courts have held that
"[s]o long as that which is viewed or heard is perceptible to the
naked eye or unaided ear, the person seen or heard has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in what occurs."11
Thus, courts have held that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in "open fields" outside the curtilage of a home;12
in a yard enclosed by a chain link fence;13
or in a condominium-complex garage that was open to the public,
used for access to the units, and contained no warning signs prohibiting
entry.14
On the other hand, courts have held that there was a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an enclosed backyard patio15
or behind a six foot fence surrounding a backyard, even though activities
inside the backyard could be seen through knotholes and gaps in
the fence.16
The anti-paparazzi
law does have an important exception for investigations of suspected
illegal or fraudulent activity.17
The exception applies both to law enforcement personnel and "employees
of governmental agencies or other entities, public or private,"
who, in the course and scope of their employment and supported by
an "articulable suspicion," attempt to photograph, videotape, or
record another person as part of an investigation of illegal activity
or other fraudulent activity "involving a violation of law or pattern
of business practices adversely affecting the public health or safety."
This exception should provide some protection to mainstream news
media engaged in investigative reporting.
Moreover, it appears that broadcasters and
publishers are immune from liability for merely using images that
were captured in violation of the statute. The law states that "[s]ale,
transmission, publication, broadcast, or use of any image ... shall
not in itself constitute a violation" of the law. However, a person
who directs or otherwise causes another person to commit a "physical"
or "constructive" invasion of privacy, regardless of whether there
is an employer-employee relationship, may be liable for general,
special, and punitive damages.18
Thus, a media organization may not be penalized for publishing an
image it obtains from someone else who violated the anti-paparazzi
law, as long as the violation was not directed or caused by the
publisher.
Constitutional Challenge?
The anti-paparazzi law raises significant
constitutional issues. The first problem underlying the law is that
it was designed and intended to be a restriction on the media. While
the media may have no special protection from the general laws19-such
as laws prohibiting trespass, stalking, false imprisonment, or assault
and battery-the United States Supreme Court has made clear that
the government may not enact laws that are directed at protected
First Amendment activities without a compelling governmental interest.
Newsgathering is protected by the First Amendment.20
It is hard to imagine any compelling government interest that would
justify singling out the media for liability under this law.
Second, the law is subject to challenge
on the ground that it is vague and overly broad. The vagueness doctrine
requires that law be written clearly enough to give citizens a reasonable
chance to know what the law prohibits so that they may behave lawfully.21
The overbreadth doctrine prohibits laws that are so sweeping that,
along with its allowable proscriptions, it also restricts constitutionally
protected rights of free speech, press, or assembly.22
As discussed above, California's anti-paparazzi law broadly defines
"personal or familial activity" to include anything that the target
of a news report wants to keep private, including "interactions
with the plaintiff's family or significant others, or other aspects
of plaintiff's private affairs or concerns." Because these terms
and others are not defined, journalists will be left to guess whether
they are photographing a "private concern" or a newsworthy event
that is protected by the First Amendment.
Only time will tell whether the anti-paparazzi
law will withstand constitutional scrutiny. In the meantime, substantial
litigation should be expected to sort out the hornet's nest of potential
legal issues. The most likely immediate effect, unfortunately, will
be a chilling of legitimate newsgathering activities as photojournalists
ponder what they can and cannot do under the law.
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Endnotes
1. The statute, which
is codified as California Civil Code section 1708.8, went into effect
on January 1, 1999. Ten days later, a Paris judge concluded that
Princess Diana's driver was primarily responsible for the accident
that killed her, and that the paparazzi would not be charged with
causing her death. A federal "anti-paparazzi" law was introduced
in 1998, but did not pass. The federal bill, which was sponsored
by California Senator Diane Feinstein, among others, sought to make
it a crime to "persistently follow or chase" a person in a manner
that causes a person to have a reasonable fear of bodily injury
in order to film or record him or her for commercial purposes. Like
the California law, the federal bill also provided for civil actions.
It is unclear whether the bill will be reintroduced into the new
Congress.
2. See, e.g., Miller v. National Broadcasting
Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1480-81 (1986).
3. Id. at 1492; see also Shulman v. Group
W. Productions, Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 236 (1998); Dietemann
v. Time, Inc., 449 F. 2d 245, 249 (1971).
4. Opponents of the California legislation argued
that experience has proven existing laws adequately protect against
"abuse" by the media. For example, two photographers recently were
convicted of false imprisonment, receiving fines and jail times,
for following and blocking a car driven by Arnold Schwarzenegger.
Jackie Onassis obtained a restraining order against a photographer
who followed and harassed her family. Another family recently obtained
an injunction against an Inside Edition crew that had been
accused of following family members and showing up outside their
property.
5. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a).
6. See id. § 1708.8(k).
7. See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 762, 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 126 (1983).
8. Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232
Cal. Rptr. 668, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1483 (1986); see also
Shulman v. Group W. Productions, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843,
18 Cal. 4th 200, 235-36 (1998).
9. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(c).
10. See id. § 1708.8(b).
11. People v. Arno, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 90
Cal. App. 3d 505, 511 (1979).
12. See, e.g., Soli v. Superior Court, 162
Cal. Rptr. 840, 103 Cal. App. 3d 72, 79 (1980); see also Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
13. See People v. Mendoza, 176 Cal. Rptr.
293, 122 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 14 (1981).
14. See People v. Galan, 209 Cal Rptr. 837,
163 Cal. App. 3d 786, 793 (1985).
15. See People v. Arroyo, 174 Cal. Rptr.
678, 120 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 27, 34 (1981).
16. See People v. Lovelace, 172 Cal. Rptr.
65, 116 Cal. App. 3d 541, 549 (1981). Another court has held that
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy inside a building,
even if a defect in venetian blinds allowed one to peek inside.
See Jacobs v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. Rptr. 449, 36 Cal.
App. 3d 489, 498 (1973).
17. See Cal. Civ. Code §1708.8(f).
18. See id. § 1708.8(c).
19. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
663 (1991)
20. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 681-82 (1972).
21. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
22. See, e.g., Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S.
451, 458 (1987).
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