



# PUBLIC NOTICE

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## PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU ANNOUNCES EXEMPTION OF CERTAIN UNCREWED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) AND UAS CRITICAL COMPONENTS FROM FCC COVERED LIST

**WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, EA Docket No. 21-233**

The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC or Commission) Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) maintains a list of equipment and services (Covered List) that have been determined to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.”<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to section 2 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Secure Networks Act)<sup>2</sup> and sections 1.50002(a) and 1.50003 of the Commission’s rules,<sup>3</sup> PSHSB announces the exemption of certain uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components from the Covered List.

National Security Determinations. On December 21, 2025, the Commission received a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that UAS produced in a foreign country pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons.<sup>4</sup> The National Security Determination concluded that such UAS and UAS critical components should be included on the FCC’s Covered List, unless the Department of War (DoW) or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes a specific determination to the FCC that a given UAS or class of UAS, or a specific UAS critical component, does not pose such risks. Accordingly, the Commission

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<sup>1</sup> Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-124, 133 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1609) (Secure Networks Act); 47 CFR §§ 1.50002, 1.50003. For the current version of the Covered List, see Federal Communications Commission, *List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act*, <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist> (last updated December 22, 2025).

<sup>2</sup> 47 U.S.C. § 1601.

<sup>3</sup> 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003; see also *Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through FCC Programs*, WC Docket No. 18-89, Second Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd 14284 (2020) (*Supply Chain Second Report and Order*).

<sup>4</sup> *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Addition of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components Produced Abroad, and Equipment and Services Listed In Section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, to FCC Covered List*, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 25-1086 (Dec. 22, 2025) (*UAS Public Notice*). Separately, the National Security Determination found similar “unacceptable risks” were posed by “all communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in Section 1709(a)(1) of the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act.” *Id.* at 2.

added all UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List.<sup>5</sup> The Commission stated, “If we receive a further specific determination from the Department of War or the Department of Homeland Security that a given UAS, class of UAS, or UAS critical component does not pose unacceptable risks, we will further update the Covered List.”<sup>6</sup>

On January 7, 2026, the Commission received a subsequent National Security Determination from the DoW with additional specific determinations regarding certain UAS and UAS critical components. The National Security Determination from the DoW states that:

“The DoW has determined that [UAS](#) and [UAS critical components](#) included on Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA’s) Blue UAS list do not currently present unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or to the safety and security of U.S. persons. This determination includes UAS and UAS critical components included on the Blue UAS list now and until January 1, 2027. Additionally, until January 1, 2027, the DoW has determined that UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as ‘domestic end products’ under the Buy American Standard do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or to the safety and security of U.S. persons.”<sup>7</sup>

Based on these findings, the DoW concluded that the following equipment should be removed from the FCC’s Covered List because it does not pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons: “UAS and UAS critical components included on DCMA’s Blue UAS list now and until January 1, 2027”; and “UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as ‘domestic end products’ under the Buy American Standard,” until January 1, 2027.<sup>8</sup>

The Covered List. We find that the National Security Determination constitutes a specific determination with regard to an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security or safety of United States persons pursuant to section 2 of the Secure Networks Act.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, we conclude that the Commission is required to update the Covered List to exclude the equipment identified in this determination. We update the Covered List to exempt: [UAS](#) and [UAS critical components](#) included on DCMA’s Blue UAS Cleared List now and until January 1, 2027; and UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as “[domestic end products](#)” under the Buy American Standard (48 CFR § 25.101(a)), until January 1, 2027.

PSHSB takes this action under its authority and obligation to publish and maintain the Covered List. Sections 1.50002(a) and 1.50003 of the Commission’s rules require PSHSB to publish the Covered

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<sup>5</sup> *Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Addition of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components Produced Abroad, and Equipment and Services Listed In Section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, to FCC Covered List*, WC Docket No. 18-89, Public Notice, DA 25-1086 (Dec. 22, 2025) (*UAS Public Notice*).

<sup>6</sup> *UAS Public Notice* at 3.

<sup>7</sup> National Security Determination at 1. The determination noted that this did not apply to devices listed in Section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. *Id.* at 1, n.2.

<sup>8</sup> The National Security Determination stated that “For the purpose of this determination, the term ‘domestic end product’ has the meaning found in 48 CFR § 25.101(a).” *See* National Security Determination at 4. The “Blue UAS list” referred to in the National Security Determination is the combination of the “Blue UAS Cleared List” at <https://bluelist.appsplatformportals.us/Cleared-List/> and the list of compliant UAS components and software at <https://bluelist.appsplatformportals.us/Framework/>. We use the term “Blue UAS Cleared List” to refer to both lists.

<sup>9</sup> Secure Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1601(b)-(d).

List on the Commission's website, to maintain and update the Covered List, and to monitor the status of determinations.<sup>10</sup>

The updated Covered List is attached as Appendix A to this Public Notice and is also found on the Bureau's website at <https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist>.<sup>11</sup>

We note the continued availability of FCC staff guidance pursuant to sections 0.191 and 0.31(i) of the Commission's rules. Commission staff will provide guidance to TCBs, test labs, and equipment authorization applicants on the impact of these updates.

For further information, please contact Chris Smeenk, Attorney Adviser, Operations and Emergency Management Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, at 202-418-1630 or [Chris.Smeenk@fcc.gov](mailto:Chris.Smeenk@fcc.gov).

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<sup>10</sup> 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003. *See Supply Chain Second Report and Order*, 35 FCC Rcd 14317, 14319, 14325, paras. 72, 77, 92.

<sup>11</sup> The FCC website also contains a list of certain affiliates and subsidiaries of entities identified on the Covered List. The list of affiliates and subsidiaries does not constitute a comprehensive list of all entities that the Commission may find, upon further examination, to qualify as relevant subsidiaries or affiliates of entities on the Covered List. Those entities, whether or not they currently provide covered communications equipment or services, are subject to the Commission's prohibitions, such as the prohibition against obtaining authorizations for covered equipment. *See Reminder: Communications Equipment And Services On The Covered List Pose An Unacceptable Risk To National Security, National Security Advisory No. 2025-01, DA 25-927*, note 3 (released October 14, 2025).

## APPENDIX A

## COVERED LIST (Updated January 7, 2026)\*†

Covered Equipment or Services*	Date of Inclusion on Covered List
Telecommunications equipment produced or provided by <b>Huawei Technologies Company</b> , including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Telecommunications equipment produced or provided by <b>ZTE Corporation</b> , including telecommunications or video surveillance services provided or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced or provided by <b>Hytera Communications Corporation</b> , to the extent it is used for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced or provided by <b>Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company</b> , to the extent it is used for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced or provided by <b>Dahua Technology Company</b> , to the extent it is used for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided by such entity or using such equipment.	March 12, 2021
Information security products, solutions, and services supplied, directly or indirectly, by <b>AO Kaspersky Lab</b> or any of its predecessors, successors, parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates.	March 25, 2022
International telecommunications services provided by <b>China Mobile International USA Inc.</b> subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	March 25, 2022
Telecommunications services provided by <b>China Telecom (Americas) Corp.</b> subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	March 25, 2022
International telecommunications services provided by <b>Pacific Networks Corp.</b> and its wholly-owned subsidiary <b>ComNet (USA) LLC</b> subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	September 20, 2022
International telecommunications services provided by <b>China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited</b> subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.	September 20, 2022
Cybersecurity and anti-virus software produced or provided by <b>Kaspersky Lab, Inc.</b> or any of its successors and assignees.	July 23, 2024
Uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country <sup>††</sup> —except, until January 1, 2027, (a) <a href="#">UAS</a> and <a href="#">UAS critical components</a> included on the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA’s) Blue UAS Cleared List, <sup>#</sup> and (b) UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as “domestic end products” under the Buy American Standard, <a href="#">48 CFR 25.101(a)</a> —and all communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in Section 1709(a)(1) of the <a href="#">FY25 National Defense Authorization Act</a> (Pub. L. 118-159).	December 22, 2025 Updated: January 7, 2026

\*The inclusion of producers or providers of equipment or services named on this list should be read to include the subsidiaries and affiliates of such entities.

†Where equipment or services on the list are identified by category, such category should be construed to include only equipment or services capable of the functions outlined in sections 2(b)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, 47 U.S.C. § 1601(b)(2)(A)-(C).

††For purposes of inclusion of UAS and UAS critical components, we incorporate the definitions included in the associated [National Security Determination](#).

#The “Blue UAS list” referred to in the [National Security Determination](#) is the combination of the “Blue UAS Cleared List” at <https://bluelist.appsplatformportals.us/Cleared-List/> and the list of compliant UAS components and software at <https://bluelist.appsplatformportals.us/Framework/>. We use the term “Blue UAS Cleared List” to refer to both lists.

## APPENDIX B

**National Security Determination on the Threat Posed by Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components***January 7, 2026***Determination**

Pursuant to the National Security Determination sent to the Federal Communications Commission by an Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise,<sup>1</sup> the Department of War (DoW) has determined that certain Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS critical components<sup>2</sup> do not currently pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States and therefore should be removed from FCC's Covered List.

The DoW has determined that [UAS](#) and [UAS critical components](#) included on Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) Blue UAS list do not currently present unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or to the safety and security of U.S. persons. This determination includes UAS and UAS critical components included on the Blue UAS list now and until January 1, 2027.

Additionally, until January 1, 2027, the DoW has determined that UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as "domestic end products" under the Buy American Standard do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or to the safety and security of U.S. persons.<sup>3</sup>

This determination will terminate on January 1, 2027 unless superseded by a newer national security determination.

**Summary of Determination and Supporting Evidence**

On December 22, 2025, the FCC added all UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country to its Covered List.<sup>4</sup> This followed a specific determination by an executive branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise that such devices pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons and should be included on the FCC's Covered List, unless the DoW or the Department of Homeland Security makes a specific determination to the FCC that a given UAS or UAS critical component, or a class thereof does not pose such risks.<sup>5</sup> This memo constitutes a specific determination by DoW, pursuant to the earlier National Security Determination, that a specified UAS and UAS critical components do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons.

*Blue UAS*

The DoW has determined that [UAS](#) and [UAS critical components](#) included on DCMA's Blue UAS list do not currently present unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or to the safety and security of U.S. persons. The Blue UAS list consists of UAS and UAS components that have gone

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/National-Security-Determination-for-UAS.pdf> at 2.

<sup>2</sup> For purposes of this determination, "UAS and UAS critical components" does not refer to any device listed in Section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA.

<sup>3</sup> 48 CFR § 25.101(a).

<sup>4</sup> <https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-25-1086A1.pdf> at 1.

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/National-Security-Determination-for-UAS.pdf> at 2.

through rigorous cyber and hardware assessments to ensure their technology complies with hardware, software, supply chain, and data privacy standards established by multiple National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) and other federal policy guidelines. The Department assesses that all UAS and UAS critical components included on the Blue UAS list are compliant with current U.S. law and regulations and validated as cyber secure. Given the rigorous security testing done on these systems and components, DoW determines that the UAS and UAS components included on the Blue UAS list do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or to the safety and security of U.S. persons and should not be included on FCC's Covered List.

The DoW's Blue UAS initiative assesses UAS and UAS components to ensure compliance with Section 848 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 817 of the FY2023 NDAA, and the *American Security Drone Act* included in the FY24 NDAA.<sup>6</sup> These NDAA provisions prohibit DoW from procuring or operating UAS or UAS critical components that are manufactured in a covered foreign country or by an entity domiciled in a covered foreign country. The Blue assessment checks compliance with these statutes as well as ensuring that the platforms clear cybersecurity standards, including rigorous penetration testing. UAS and UAS components included on the Blue UAS list have met the highest security standards so they are able to operate in sensitive environments, protect sensitive information, and prevent cyber vulnerabilities. Given the extensive testing of the Blue listed UAS and UAS critical components, the DoW has determined that UAS and UAS components included on the Blue UAS list, do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States.

While the DoW has determined that UAS and UAS components included on the Blue UAS list do not currently pose immediate national security risks to the American homeland, reliance on any foreign country for critical UAS components still creates significant vulnerabilities for the domestic drone industrial base. President Trump's Executive Order on Unleashing American Drone Dominance and the National Security Strategy clearly outline that it is a national security imperative to have an independent, robust, and resilient domestic drone industrial base and supply chain.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, this national security determination shall terminate on January 1, 2027, and be reassessed to determine if the import of Blue listed UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country threatens the resiliency of our domestic drone industrial base.

#### *Buy American Standards*

Until January 1, 2027, DoW has determined that UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as "domestic end products" under the Buy American Standard do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or to the safety and security of U.S. persons.<sup>8</sup>

President Trump has made clear through the Executive Order to Unleash American Drone Dominance and the National Security Strategy that the United States must have an independent and resilient industrial base for critical dual-use technology, including drones and drone components. The National Security Determination on foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components stated: "Relying on UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries poses an unacceptable national security risk to the United States. To ensure American companies are able to meet both peacetime and wartime demand, the

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<sup>6</sup> National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92 § 848.

James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263 § 817.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-31 § 1821 – 1832.

<sup>7</sup> Executive Order 14307. "Unleashing American Drone Dominance" June 2025.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/06/unleashing-american-drone-dominance/>.

"National Security Strategy of the United States of America." November 2025. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf>.

<sup>8</sup> 48 CFR § 25.101(a).

U.S. drone industry cannot rely on foreign-produced UAS critical components.”<sup>9</sup> The DoW has determined that UAS and UAS critical components that meet the Buy American “domestic end product” standard currently support the Administration’s national security imperative to build an American drone industrial base and do not present unacceptable risks to U.S. national security.

To meet the Buy American definition of a “domestic end product,” UAS or UAS critical components must be manufactured in the United States and ensure the cost of domestic components must exceed 65 percent of the total cost of the finished product.<sup>10</sup> Until January 1, 2027, UAS and UAS critical components that meet the Buy American “domestic end product” standard do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States.

While the Buy American standards support American manufacturing, it is critical that we have a fully independent and robust domestic drone supply chain. The United States must have the ability to manufacture drones at scale in both peacetime and wartime. To achieve this strategic imperative, industry should plan for the domestic content requirement for UAS and UAS critical components to continue to increase in the following years. Industry should use the Buy American standards as a baseline with plans to increase their domestic content requirement. In line with President Trump’s revitalization of American manufacturing through America First policies, UAS and UAS critical components must be built in America. This determination will terminate on January 1, 2027, and shall be reassessed prior to its termination to assess how much the domestic content required should increase to meet this goal.

#### **Definitions:**

*FCC:* For the purpose of this determination, the term “FCC” shall mean the Federal Communications Commission.

*Domestic End Product:* For the purpose of this determination, the term “domestic end product” has the meaning found in 48 CFR § 25.101(a).

*Uncrewed Aircraft (UA):* For the purpose of this determination, the term “uncrewed aircraft (UA)” has the meaning found in 47 CFR 88.5: *An aircraft operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft.*

*Uncrewed Aircraft System (UAS):* For the purpose of this determination, the term “uncrewed aircraft system (UAS)” has the meaning found in 47 CFR 88.5: *An Uncrewed Aircraft and its associated elements (including an uncrewed aircraft station, communication links, and the components not on board the UA that control the UA) that are required for the safe and efficient operation of the UA in the airspace of the United States.*

*UAS Critical Components:* For the purpose of this determination, the term “UAS critical components” includes but is not limited to the following UAS components and any associated software:

- Data transmission devices
- Communications systems
- Flight controllers
- Ground control stations and UAS controllers
- Navigation systems
- Sensors and Cameras

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<sup>9</sup> <https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-25-1086A1.pdf>.

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-48/chapter-1/subchapter-D/part-25/subpart-25.1/section-25.101>.

- Batteries and Battery Management Systems
- Motors