

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

IN THE MATTER OF:)
)
) Number 2020-2
Larry Dean Harmon)
d/b/a Helix)
)
Akron, Ohio)

ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL MONEY PENALTY

I. INTRODUCTION

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has determined that grounds exist to assess a civil money penalty against Larry Dean Harmon, as the primary operator of Helix, and as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and primary operator of Coin Ninja LLC (Coin Ninja), pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and regulations issued pursuant to that Act.¹

FinCEN has the authority to investigate and impose civil money penalties on money services businesses (MSBs) that willfully violate the BSA and on current and former employees who willfully participate in such violations.² Rules implementing the BSA state that “[o]verall authority for enforcement and compliance, including coordination and direction of procedures and activities of all other agencies exercising delegated authority under this chapter” has been delegated by the Secretary of the Treasury to FinCEN.³ At all relevant times, both Mr. Harmon, doing business as Helix, and Coin Ninja were “money transmitters” as defined at 31 C.F.R § 1010.100(ff)(5) and a “financial institutions” as defined at 31 C.F.R § 1010.100(t).

1. The BSA is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951-1959 and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314, 5316-5332. Regulations implementing the BSA appear at 31 C.F.R. Chapter X.

2. Treasury Order 180-01 (July 1, 2014); 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.810(a).

3. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.810(a).

Mr. Harmon has been indicted in the District of Columbia under related criminal charges pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1960 for conspiracy to launder monetary instruments and the operation of an unlicensed money transmitting business.⁴

II. JURISDICTION

Mr. Harmon, doing business as Helix, operated as an “exchanger” of convertible virtual currencies, accepting bitcoin and transmitting bitcoin to another person or location by a variety of means.⁵ Beginning on or about June 6, 2014, through on or about December 16, 2017, Mr. Harmon doing business as Helix, conducted over 1,225,000 transactions for customers and is associated with virtual currency wallet addresses that have sent or received over \$311 million. FinCEN has identified at least 356,000 bitcoin transactions through Helix between June 2014 and December 2017. Beginning on or about July 13, 2017 through the present, Mr. Harmon served as CEO of Coin Ninja, a Delaware-incorporated and Ohio-located money transmitter that operates as an exchanger of convertible virtual currencies. Mr. Harmon willfully participated in the direction and supervision of Coin Ninja’s operations and finances. Exchangers of convertible virtual currency are “money transmitters” as defined at 31 C.F.R § 1010.100(ff)(5) and “financial institutions” as defined at 31 C.F.R § 1010.100(t).

III. DETERMINATIONS

FinCEN has determined that, from on or about June 6, 2014 through December 3, 2019, Mr. Harmon, doing business as Helix, willfully violated the BSA’s registration, program, and reporting requirements.⁶ Mr. Harmon, doing business as Helix, willfully (a) failed to register as a money services business;⁷ (b) failed to implement and maintain an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program;⁸ and (c) failed to report certain

4. *United States of America v. Larry Dean Harmon*, 19-cr-00395, (D.C. DC, Dec. 3, 2019).

5. FIN-2013-G001, “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies,” March 18, 2013.

6. In civil enforcement of the BSA under 31 U.S.C. §5321(a)(1), to establish that a financial institution or individual acted willfully, the government need only show that the financial institution or individual acted with either reckless disregard or willful blindness. The government need not show that the entity or individual had knowledge that the conduct violated the BSA, or that the entity or individual otherwise acted with an improper motive or bad purpose.

7. 31 U.S.C. § 5330 and 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380.

8. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) and 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210.

suspicious activity.⁹ In addition, FinCEN has determined that on or about July 13, 2017 through December 3, 2019, Mr. Harmon willfully participated in Coin Ninja's failure to register as a money services business.¹⁰

These violations, and the governing facts and law surrounding the violations, are described more fully in the Statement of Facts (Attachment A), which is fully incorporated here by reference.

IV. CIVIL MONEY PENALTY

FinCEN determined that Mr. Harmon, in his roles with Helix and Coin Ninja, willfully violated the BSA and its implementing regulations, as described in this ASSESSMENT and Attachment A, and that grounds exist to assess a civil money penalty for these violations.¹¹ FinCEN determined that the maximum penalty in this matter is **\$209,144,554**.¹²

FinCEN may impose a civil money penalty of \$57,317 for each willful violation of AML program requirements assessed on or after October 10, 2019.¹³ The BSA states that a "separate violation" of the requirement to establish and implement an effective AML program occurs "for each day that the violation continues."¹⁴ The authorized penalty for each violation of MSB registration requirements assessed on or after October 10, 2019 is \$8,457.¹⁵ The BSA states that "each day" a violation of the failure to register as a MSB continues "constitutes a separate violation."¹⁶ FinCEN may impose a penalty not to exceed the greater of the amount involved in the transaction (but capped at \$229,269) or \$57,317 for each willful violation of SAR requirements assessed on or after October 10, 2019.¹⁷

9. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) and 31 C.F.R. § 1022.320.

10. 31 U.S.C. § 5330 and 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380.

11. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321 and 5330(e); 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.820 and 821.

12. Pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Act of 2015 (Pub. L. 114-74) ("the 2015 Act"), increased civil money penalties apply only with respect to underlying violations occurring after the enactment of the 2015 Act, i.e., after November 2, 2015.

13. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1); 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.820(i) and 821.

14. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1).

15. 31 U.S.C. § 5330(e)(1); 31 C.F.R. §§ 1022.380(e) and 1010.821.

16. 31 U.S.C. § 5330 and 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380(e).

17. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1); 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.820(i) and 821.

V. CONSIDERATION OF PENALTY FACTORS

On February 6, 2020, FinCEN provided Helix with a written pre-assessment notice that included a draft ASSESSMENT and Statement of Facts (the “PAN package”). The PAN package provided Helix with FinCEN’s charges outlining violations of the BSA and its implementing regulations, the factors taken into consideration in determining whether to assess a civil money penalty and the proposed civil money penalty amount, and instructions on how to respond to these charges. Helix responded, through counsel, on March 6, 2020 denying that it operated as a MSB and requesting more time to respond to FinCEN’s Statement of Facts. FinCEN provided Helix with multiple opportunities to respond to the PAN package. To date, over eight months since FinCEN issued its PAN package, Helix has not provided any additional information or documentation responding to the allegations or considerations contained in FinCEN’s PAN package. As such, FinCEN concludes that Helix has decided not to submit any new facts or explanations for consideration. In light of this, FinCEN has considered the following factors in determining the disposition of this matter:

1. Nature and seriousness of the violations and harm to the public. The violations outlined in this ASSESSMENT are considered by FinCEN to be of a serious and egregious nature. The BSA and its implementing regulations require MSBs and money transmitters such as Helix to develop and implement a risk-based AML program designed to deter illicit financial activity and report suspicious activity, among other things, in order to assist law enforcement in detecting crimes. In this instance, Helix operated as a MSB in a high-risk industry that deals in convertible virtual currencies without developing an AML program and, in fact, provided its services in such a manner that it assisted and facilitated illicit financial activity. As a sophisticated enterprise, Helix worked in conjunction with darknet marketplaces to launder illicit bitcoin proceeds and actively marketed its services as an anonymity-enhancing service to launder bitcoin from illicit activity. For example, FinCEN observed bitcoin transactions equal to \$121,511,877 transferred to darknet-associated addresses by, through, or to Helix.

2. Impact of violations on FinCEN's mission to safeguard the financial system.

Helix was totally and completely deficient in its compliance with the BSA and its implementing regulations during the entire course of Helix's operation. FinCEN analysis evidenced that Helix failed to maintain all required elements of an AML program. During the lifespan of the MSB, Helix developed no AML program and was vulnerable to illicit use. In addition to having no AML program, Helix further failed to designate a compliance officer, conduct any AML training for employees, and never conducted an independent test required under law. Rather than collect customer data as part of a viable AML program, Helix asserted that it deleted even the minimal customer information it did collect for all transactions it facilitated. Helix also failed to conduct appropriate suspicious activity monitoring from 2014 through 2017, making it difficult to completely ascertain the number of specific reporting violations that exist. Independent FinCEN analysis of Helix's public records and analysis of convertible virtual currency blockchains identified at least 245,817 instances in which suspicious transactions took place. Yet, Helix failed to file a single SAR throughout the corresponding time period.

3. Pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the financial institution. Helix openly flaunted existing regulatory requirements and went out its way to create ways for darknet customers and vendors to avoid law enforcement detection. Helix purposefully created a system to facilitate illicit activity, which was recognized by darknet drug vendors like AlphaBay – a marketplace that integrated Helix into its platform. Rather than institute policies and procedures to comply with the BSA, Helix instead instituted policies and procedures that allowed customers of darknet marketplaces to launder bitcoin through Helix.

4. History and duration of violations. Helix operated for over three years, from April 2014 to December 2017, without appropriate AML policies and procedures in place. Helix did not implement even basic AML program requirements and specifically sought to launder bitcoin from illegal activity.

5. Failure to terminate the violations. After Helix closed operations in December 2017, Helix continued to operate another unregistered MSB by creating, controlling, and operating the money transmitter Coin Ninja LLC in 2017, which operated through February 6, 2020.
6. Financial gain or other benefit as a result of violation. Helix made a significant financial gain in administrator fees from its facilitation of transactions with darknet marketplaces, ransomware, child exploitation websites, and unregistered MSBs. Helix did not expend any resources on compliance with the BSA and its implementing regulations.
7. Cooperation. Helix agreed to two statute of limitations tolling agreements with FinCEN.
8. Systemic nature of violations. Helix's systemic failure to report potentially suspicious activity led to shortcomings that denied potentially critical information to the BSA database for at least a three-year period. FinCEN's independent investigation found that Helix conducted numerous potentially suspicious transactions with darknet marketplaces, ransomware, unregistered MSBs, and other mixing platforms offering similar money laundering services.
9. Timely and Voluntary Disclosure of Violations. FinCEN did not consider this as an aggravating or mitigating factor in this matter.
10. Penalties by Other Government Entities. FinCEN is the sole government regulator with authority to pursue civil violations of the BSA and its implementing regulations for MSBs.¹⁸ FinCEN has considered Helix's indictment in the District of Columbia under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1960 for conspiracy to launder monetary instruments and the operation of an unlicensed money transmitting business.¹⁹

18. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.810(a); Treasury Order 180-01 (July 1, 2014).

19. *United States of America v. Larry Dean Harmon*, 19-cr-00395, (D.C. DC, Dec. 3, 2019).

As a result of the analysis described above, FinCEN hereby imposes a penalty in the amount of **\$60,000,000**.

Kenneth A. Blanco

Date:

Director

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

U.S. Department of the Treasury

Attachment A

Statement of Facts

I. Background

A. Larry Dean Harmon and Coin Ninja

1. Larry Dean Harmon (Mr. Harmon) is a U.S. person residing in Akron, Ohio. Mr. Harmon was the creator, administrator, and primary operator of Grams, a darknet website that operated on the onion router (Tor) network and advertised itself as the “Google of the Darkweb” from in or about April 2014 through on or about December 16, 2017. Grams served as a search engine and content aggregator allowing users to search for illicit goods sold on darknet markets. Grams also indexed darknet .onion pages for vendors of illicit goods such as narcotics, illegal firearms, and stolen Personally Identifiable Information (PII).
2. On or about June 2014, Mr. Harmon began operating and administering a convertible virtual currency exchanger called Helix through the Grams darknet .onion site.¹ Mr. Harmon was the primary administrator and operator of Helix. Helix was a service linked to and affiliated with Grams, and the two services were sometimes referred to collectively as “Grams-Helix.” Helix operated what is commonly referred to as a “mixer” or “tumbler” of the convertible virtual currency bitcoin – charging customers a fee to send bitcoin to a designated address in a manner designed to conceal and obfuscate the source or owner of the bitcoin. Mr. Harmon offered customers two options to transmit “tumbled” bitcoin: Helix and Helix Light. Helix was built as a function into customer’s Grams “account” and operated in the following manner:
 - a. Customers would send bitcoin to a wallet associated with their Grams account;
 - b. Customers would then complete a Helix withdrawal form, which included the amount to withdraw, a destination address, and the ability to set a time delay for the transactions;
 - c. Helix would transmit the bitcoin deposited into their wallet to one of numerous accounts held at different exchangers of convertible virtual currency;
 - d. Helix would take bitcoin from a different account it held and transmit that bitcoin to a different bitcoin address;
 - e. From this bitcoin address, Helix would then transmit bitcoin to the customer, minus a fee, into the previously provided customer destination address;
 - f. Helix asserted that it deleted customer information after seven days, or allowed customers to delete their logs manually after a withdrawal.

1. “Introducing Grams Helix: Bitcoin Cleaner,” DeepDotWeb, June 22, 2014, Accessed January 24, 2018.

3. Helix Light was a service of Helix that allowed individuals to transact without creating a Grams “account.” Helix Light conducted transactions in the following manner:
 - a. Customers were asked to provide a destination address to receive bitcoins;
 - b. Helix Light would provide an address to which the customer would send the desired amount of bitcoin between .02 and 6 bitcoins;
 - c. Helix Light would transmit the bitcoin deposited into their wallet to one of numerous accounts held at different exchangers of convertible virtual currency;
 - d. Helix Light would take bitcoin from a different account it held and transmit that bitcoin to a different bitcoin address;
 - e. From this bitcoin address, Helix Light would then transmit bitcoin to the customer, minus a fee, into the previously provided customer destination address;
4. On or about July 13, 2017, Mr. Harmon, through his legal representative, registered Coin Ninja LLC (Coin Ninja) in Delaware. Mr. Harmon later filed a corporate registration in Ohio on November 8, 2017.² Mr. Harmon is the Chief Executive Officer of Coin Ninja, which operates as a money services business. Mr. Harmon willfully participated in the direction and supervision of Coin Ninja’s operations and finances. Coin Ninja has stated on its Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) page that it also provided a “mixing” service including an “FAQ” titled “Why should I mix my bitcoins?”³ Coin Ninja offers a service called DropBit, which describes itself as “like Venmo for Bitcoin” allowing customers to accept and transmit bitcoin through text messages or Twitter handles.⁴ Mr. Harmon has advertised Coin Ninja’s DropBit service on Reddit, under the moniker “doolbman,” as a service that helps circumvent know your customer procedures.⁵

B. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

5. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is a bureau within the Department of Treasury. Pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 1010.810, FinCEN has “[o]verall authority for enforcement and compliance, including coordination and direction of procedures and activities of all other agencies exercising delegated authority” under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and its implementing regulations. FinCEN regulates money services businesses and other financial institutions under the BSA.⁶

2. Registration of Foreign for Profit Limited Liability Company Document Number 201731201776, State of Ohio Secretary of State, November 8, 2017.

3. “Frequently Asked Questions,” <https://coinninja.io/faq>, February 14, 2018.

4. @dropbitapp, Twitter, <https://twitter.com/dropbitapp>, accessed November 20, 2019.

5. doolbman, “Send Bitcoin instead of Venmo or PayPal. Spread the wealth,” https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/awnvoi/send_bitcoin_instead_of_venmo_or_paypal_spread/ehnv18u/?context=3, March 2, 2019.

6. See Treasury Order 180-01 (July 1, 2014).

C. Mixers and Tumblers Status as Money Transmitters Under the BSA

6. Providers of anonymizing services, commonly referred to as “mixers” or “tumblers,” are either persons that accept convertible virtual currencies and retransmit them in a manner designed to prevent others from tracing the transmission back to its source (anonymizing services provider). An anonymizing services provider is a money transmitter under FinCEN regulations because it accepts and transmits convertible virtual currencies.⁷

II. Anti-Money Laundering/Bank Secrecy Act Violations

A. Failure to Register as a Money Services Business

7. The BSA and its implementing regulations require the registration of an MSB within 180 days of beginning operations and the renewal of such registration every two years.⁸
8. Mr. Harmon began operating Helix in June 2014 and ceased operations in December 2017 and never registered as an MSB with FinCEN.
9. Before closing Helix, Mr. Harmon began operating Coin Ninja on or about July 13, 2017. Neither Coin Ninja, nor its DropBit service, have ever registered as an MSB with FinCEN.

B. Failure to Implement an Anti-Money Laundering Program

10. Since July 24, 2002, MSBs have been required to “develop, implement, and maintain an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program.”⁹ The program must be in writing and commensurate with the risks posed by the location and size of, and the nature and volume of the financial services provided by the MSB.¹⁰ An effective AML program is one that is reasonably designed to prevent the MSB from being used to facilitate money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities.¹¹ MSBs must, “[i]ncorporate policies, procedures, and internal controls reasonably designed to assure compliance....”¹² An MSB is also required to designate a person to assure day to day compliance with its AML program.¹³ An MSB must provide for training of personnel, including training in the detection of suspicious transactions and provide for independent review to monitor and maintain an adequate program.¹⁴ Mr. Harmon never implemented any type of AML program related to Helix and failed to comply with all of the aforementioned requirements.

7. “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies,” (FIN-2019-G001),” May 9, 2019, p.19-20.

8. 31 U.S.C. § 5330 and 31 C.F.R. §§ 1022.380(b)(2) and (3).

9. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(a).

10. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(b).

11. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(a).

12. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(d)(1).

13. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(d)(2).

14. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(d)(3)-(4).

i. Policies, Procedures, and Internal Controls

11. An MSB is required to have a compliance program that includes “[a] system of internal controls to assure ongoing compliance.”¹⁵ Mr. Harmon failed to establish and maintain appropriate internal controls to ensure compliance with the BSA’s reporting requirements during the operation of his business. In fact, Mr. Harmon actively aided cybercriminals and other threat actors in circumventing the policies, procedures, and internal controls in place at U.S.-based convertible virtual currency exchanges. Through his services Mr. Harmon promoted unlawful online activities by concealing the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, and the control of the proceeds of online drug sales, amongst other illegal online activities.
12. Mr. Harmon publicly advertised Helix on Reddit forums dedicated to darknet marketplaces, actively seeking out and facilitating high-risk transactions directly through customer service and feedback. On December 7, 2014, Mr. Harmon, using the online moniker “gramsadmin,” posted, “Helix does exactly what it says it does, breaks the blockchain taint so a transaction can’t be followed through the blockchain. Helix gives you new bitcoins [sic] from a different pool, that have never been on the darkweb.”¹⁶ On November 24, 2014, Mr. Harmon, using the same online moniker and forum, identified transactions passing from a specific darknet marketplace through Helix, stating “Since Helix uses expiring addresses and all the Agora withdrawals just started coming[.] I have a bunch of unclaimed bitcoins.”¹⁷
13. Despite requiring account creation for transactions through Helix, Mr. Harmon chose not to collect information on any of the over 809,500 unique addresses sending and receiving bitcoin. In addition, Mr. Harmon developed Helix Light so that customers could conduct transactions without even creating the accounts required by the Helix service offered through his Grams platform. As a result, Mr. Harmon failed to collect and verify customer names, addresses, or any other related customer identifiers on over 1.2 million transactions between June 2016 and December 2017 alone.
14. In fact, during its entire operational period, Mr. Harmon openly advertised Helix as a service that did not conduct customer due diligence, stating “My goals with Helix light [and] Regular helix [have] always and will always work to perfection for tumbling bitcoins and keeping a user anonymous.”¹⁸ During the operational period, Mr. Harmon conducted over \$311 million worth of transactions in convertible virtual currencies without performing appropriate due diligence on transactions or customers.

15. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(b)(2)(i).

16. gramsadmin, “Helix : Agora bitcoin claim process?,” https://www.reddit.com/r/DarkNetMarkets/comments/2oi5jh/helix_deanonimization_the_response/, December 7, 2014.

gramsadmin, “Helix : Agora bitcoin claim process?,”

17. gramsadmin, “Helix : Agora bitcoin claim process?,” https://www.reddit.com/r/DarkNetMarkets/comments/2nanzl/helix_agora_bitcoin_claim_process/Reddit, November 24, 2014.

18. gramsadmin, “Helix : Agora bitcoin claim process?,” https://www.reddit.com/r/DarkNetMarkets/comments/2nanzl/helix_agora_bitcoin_claim_process/Reddit, November 24, 2014.

15. Mr. Harmon also failed to implement policies and procedures to file reports required by the BSA and to create and retain appropriate records.¹⁹ In public fora, Mr. Harmon advertised that “All logs are deleted after 7 days, but you can delete the logs off the server manually after the helix withdraw is complete.”²⁰ Mr. Harmon asserted that he deleted any customer information Helix had after a period of seven days.²¹ Mr. Harmon also claimed to allow customers to delete their own customer information at will. Such a policy made it impossible for Mr. Harmon to comply with the requirements of the BSA. During its operations over 1.2 million transactions passed through Helix.
16. More specifically, Mr. Harmon failed to implement appropriate policies, procedures, and internal controls to detect and report potentially suspicious transactions. FinCEN identified a significant volume of transactions that bore indicia of money laundering and other illicit activity. These included transactions supporting illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, child exploitation websites, and white nationalist/neo-Nazi groups. As detailed in Section II. C (below), potentially suspicious activity going through sites controlled and operated by Mr. Harmon totaled over \$121 million.
17. Mr. Harmon failed to mitigate risks associated with Tor-enabled browsers. While use of Tor in and of itself is not suspicious, the many transactions that take place through an anonymizing internet browser, such as darknet marketplaces, may be a strong indicator of potential illicit activity when no additional due diligence is conducted. Because of this, Mr. Harmon failed to determine customer identity and whether or not the funds were derived from illegal activity.
18. Mr. Harmon failed to apply due diligence measures proportionate to the risks arising to any jurisdictions with AML/CFT deficiencies.²² These deficiencies were exacerbated by Mr. Harmon’s failure to implement appropriate due diligence over transactions occurring through Tor-enabled browsers. For example, according to FinCEN’s analysis, from June 2014 through December 2017 Mr. Harmon accepted and processed multiple transactions with Iran-affiliated accounts. Mr. Harmon failed to implement policies, procedures, and internal controls to review for potential suspicious activity occurring by, through, or to jurisdictions with a heightened risk for money laundering and terrorist finance.

19. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(d)(1)(i)(B) and (C).

20. gramsadmin, “New Grams’ Helix,” https://www.reddit.com/r/onions/comments/28t66t/new_grams_helix/, June 22, 2014.

21. Introducing Grams Helix: Bitcoins Cleaner, DeepDotWeb, June 22, 2014.

22. See “Advisory on the Financial Action Task Force-Identified Jurisdictions with AML/CFT Deficiencies (FIN-2015-A002),” July 17, 2015; “Advisory on the Financial Action Task Force-Identified Jurisdictions with AML/CFT Deficiencies (FIN-2016-A001),” January 19, 2016.

ii. Compliance Officer

19. An MSB is also required to designate a person to assure day to day compliance with their compliance program and the BSA. This person is responsible for assuring that the MSB files reports, and creates and retains records, that the compliance program is updated as necessary to reflect the current requirements of the BSA, and provides appropriate training.²³ At no point in its operations did Mr. Harmon designate a person to assure day to day compliance with their compliance program and the BSA.

iii. Training

20. An MSB must provide for training of personnel, including training in the detection of suspicious transactions.²⁴ Mr. Harmon failed to train appropriate personnel in BSA recordkeeping and reporting requirements and failed to train personnel in identifying, monitoring, and reporting suspicious activity.

iv. Independent Testing

21. An MSB must provide for independent review to monitor and maintain an adequate program.²⁵ At no point in its operations did Mr. Harmon conduct an independent test.

C. Failure to File Suspicious Activity Reports

22. The BSA and its implementing regulations require an MSB to report a transaction that the MSB “knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect” is suspicious, if the transaction is conducted or attempted by, at, or through the MSB, and the transaction involves or aggregates to at least \$2,000 in funds or other assets.²⁶ A transaction is “suspicious” if the transaction: (a) involves funds derived from illegal activity; (b) is intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activity, or to disguise the ownership, nature, source, location, or control of funds or assets derived from illegal activity; (c) is designed, whether through structuring or other means, to evade any requirement in the BSA or its implementing regulations; (d) has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which the particular customer would normally be expected to engage, and the casino knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction after examining the available facts, including the background and possible purpose of the transaction; or (e) involves use of the MSB to facilitate criminal activity. An MSB must file a SAR no later than 30 calendar days after initially detecting facts that may constitute a basis for filing a suspicious activity report.²⁷

23. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(d)(2)(i)-(iii).

24. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(d)(3).

25. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(d)(4).

26. 31 C.F.R. § 1022.320.

27. 31 C.F.R. §§ 1022.320(a)(2)(i) – (iv).

23. FinCEN has identified at least 2,464 instances in which Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR for transactions involving Helix.

i. Darknet and other Illicit Markets

24. Helix addresses were found to interact directly with 39 darknet marketplaces and other illicit markets where individuals bought and sold illicit goods and services. Bitcoin is the most common medium of exchange on these marketplaces. FinCEN observed 241,594 direct bitcoin transactions worth \$39,074,476.47 with darknet and other illicit marketplace-associated addresses, not including indirect transactions. At least 2,097 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on all darknet and other illicit market transactions.
25. **Abraxas Market.** Abraxas Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around December 2014 to around November 2015 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 776 bitcoin transactions worth \$308,077.74 directly with the Abraxas darknet marketplace. At least 25 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
26. **Agora Market.** Agora Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around January 2014 to around August 2015 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 3,978 bitcoin transactions worth \$1,725,338.13 directly with the Agora darknet marketplace. At least 131 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
27. **AlphaBay Market.** AlphaBay Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around December 2014 to July 2017, when the site was seized by law enforcement.²⁸ At the time of the seizure, AlphaBay was the largest Darknet marketplace in operation, offering a platform for customers to purchase a variety of illegal drugs, guns, and other illegal goods. In or about November 2016, the AlphaBay website recommended to its customers that they use a bitcoin tumbler service to “erase any trace of [their] coins coming from AlphaBay,” and provided an embedded link to the Tor website for Helix. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 191,988 bitcoin transactions worth \$27,066,798 directly with the AlphaBay darknet marketplace. At least 1,201 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.

28. “AlphaBay, the Largest Online ‘Dark Market,’ Shut Down,” U.S. Department of Justice, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alphabay-largest-online-dark-market-shut-down>, July 20, 2017.

28. **Aviato Market.** Aviato Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around April 2016 to around December 2017 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 406 bitcoin transactions worth \$32,439 directly with the Aviato darknet marketplace. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
29. **Black Bank Market.** Black Bank Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around March 2015 to around June 2015 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 453 bitcoin transactions worth \$179,681 directly with the Black Bank darknet marketplace. At least nine of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
30. **Doctor D Market.** Doctor D Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around March 2015 to around August 2016 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 101 bitcoin transactions worth \$43,945 directly with the Doctor D darknet marketplace. At least two of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
31. **Dream Market.** Dream Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around November 2013 to April 2019 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 20,724 bitcoin transactions worth \$3,544,497 directly with the Dream darknet marketplace. At least 250 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
32. **DutchDrugz Market.** DutchDrugz Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around January 2017 to around January 2018 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, and drug paraphernalia. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 19 bitcoin transactions worth \$29,366 directly with the DutchDrugz darknet marketplace. At least five of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
33. **Evolution Market.** Evolution Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around January 2014 to around March 2015 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 295 bitcoin transactions worth \$114,670 directly with the Evolution darknet marketplace. At least nine of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.

34. **Flugsvamp Market 2.0.** Flugsvamp Market 2.0 was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around April 2015 to around September 2018 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 758 bitcoin transactions worth \$161,774 directly with the darknet marketplace. At least 22 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions
35. **Hansa Market.** Hansa Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around August 2015 to around July 2017 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. Dutch and US law enforcement seized the market and arrested the site owners in 2017.²⁹ FinCEN observed Helix conducting 4,885 bitcoin transactions worth \$635,685 directly with the darknet marketplace. At least 26 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
36. **Hydra Market.** Hydra Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation since at least 2014 that sells illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 297 bitcoin transactions worth \$77,983 directly with the darknet marketplace. At least seven of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
37. **Joker's Stash Market.** Joker's Stash Market was an illicit market in operation from in and around October 2014 to around July 2017 that sold stolen credit card numbers and fraud-related goods and services. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 33 bitcoin transactions worth \$2,279 directly with the marketplace. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
38. **Middle Earth Marketplace.** Middle Earth Marketplace was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around July 2014 to in and around November 2015 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 353 bitcoin transactions worth \$105,231 directly with the darknet marketplace. At least 11 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.

29. "Massive Blow to Criminal Dark Web Activities after Globally Coordinated Operation," Europol, July 20, 2017, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/massive-blow-to-criminal-dark-web-activities-after-globally-coordinated-operation>.

39. **Nucleus Market.** Nucleus Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around November 2014 to in and around April 2016 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 6,405 bitcoin transactions worth \$3,480,201 directly with the darknet marketplace. At least 306 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
40. **Oasis Market.** Oasis Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around March 2016 to around September 2016 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 452 bitcoin transactions worth \$102,481 directly with the darknet marketplace. At least 12 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
41. **Russian Anonymous Marketplace.** Russian Anonymous Marketplace (RAMP) was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around November 2014 to around July 2017 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 256 bitcoin transactions worth \$120,047 directly with the darknet marketplace. At least 19 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
42. **Silk Road 2 Market.** Silk Road 2 Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around November 2013 to around November 2014 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. US law enforcement shutdown the market and arrested the site owner on November 6, 2014.³⁰ FinCEN observed Helix conducting 17 bitcoin transactions worth \$5,881 directly with the darknet marketplace. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
43. **TradeRoute Market.** TradeRoute Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around September 2016 to around September 2017 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 6,871 bitcoin transactions worth \$884,507 directly with the darknet marketplace. At least 34 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.

30. "Operator of Silk Road 2.0 Website Charged in Manhattan Federal Court," FBI, November 6, 2014, <https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/newyork/news/press-releases/operator-of-silk-road-2.0-website-charged-in-manhattan-federal-court>.

44. **Unicc.** Unicc was an illicit market in operation from in and around July 2015 to around January 2018 that sold stolen credit card numbers and other fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 134 bitcoin transactions worth over \$31,846 directly with the marketplace. FinCEN traced 0.91898767 bitcoin, worth \$2,172.51, directly exchanged with Helix from a Unicc associated wallet on June 15, 2017. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on this transaction.
45. **Valhalla Market (Silkkitie).** Valhalla Market (Silkkitie) was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around July 2015 to around June 2017 that sold illegal narcotics and controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit and fraud-related goods and services, and other illegal contraband. Finnish law enforcement seized the market and arrested the site administrators in 2019.³¹ FinCEN observed Helix conducting 1,934 bitcoin transactions worth \$388,581 directly with the darknet marketplace. At least 27 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.
46. **Wall Street Market.** Wall Street Market was a Tor-network based darknet market in operation from in and around November 2016 until May 2019. Wall Street Market was one of the world's largest dark web marketplaces that allowed vendors to sell a wide variety of contraband, including an array of illegal narcotics, counterfeit goods, and malicious computer hacking software. German and US law enforcement seized the market and arrested three administrators on May 3, 2019.³² Wall Street Market functioned like a conventional e-commerce website. FinCEN observed Helix conducting 279 bitcoin transactions worth \$23,964 directly with the darknet marketplace. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.

ii. Convertible Virtual Currency Mixing Services

47. Other providers of anonymizing services were found to frequently interact with Helix. Darknet marketplaces actively promote these additional mixers as the primary method for obfuscating bitcoin transactions. FinCEN observed bitcoin transactions equal to \$55,617,653 transferred with other mixing service-associated addresses. Of these, FinCEN observed 2,423 direct bitcoin transactions – not including indirect transactions – equal to \$2,118,476.43 between Helix and unregistered bitcoin mixing services. At least 261 of these direct transactions were for an amount over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.

31. "Double Blow To Dark Web Marketplaces," Europol, May 3, 2019, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/double-blow-to-dark-web-marketplaces>.

32. "3 Germans Who Allegedly Operated Dark Web Marketplace with Over 1 Million Users Face U.S. Narcotics and Money Laundering Charges," Department of Justice, May 3, 2019, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/3-germans-who-allegedly-operated-dark-web-marketplace-over-1-million-users-face-us>.

48. **CVC Mixer 1.** FinCEN observed Helix conducting 1,126 direct bitcoin transactions worth \$1,622,807 with CVC Mixer 1. At least 209 of these direct transactions were for amounts over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file SARs on these transactions.
49. **CVC Mixer 2.** FinCEN observed Helix conducting 92 direct bitcoin transactions worth \$287,548 with CVC Mixer 2. At least 27 of these direct transactions were for amounts over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file SARs on these transactions.
50. **CVC Mixer 3.** FinCEN observed Helix conducting 52 direct bitcoin transactions worth \$42,219 with CVC Mixer 3. At least seven of these direct transactions were for amounts over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file SARs on these transactions.
51. **CVC Mixer 4.** FinCEN observed Helix conducting 1,149 direct bitcoin transactions worth \$164,943 with CVC Mixer 4. At least 17 of these direct transactions were for amounts over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file SARs on these transactions.

iii. Darknet Child Exploitation Site

52. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on transactions of convertible virtual currency to a darknet child exploitation site. Users were allowed to send convertible virtual currency into Helix to obfuscate origins of these illicit purchases.
53. **Welcome to Video.** Welcome to Video was a Tor-network based child pornography website, which began operating in or about June 2015 and was shut down by law enforcement on October 16, 2019.³³ Welcome to Video had over 200,000 unique video files, which totaled approximately eight terabytes of data. FinCEN observed Helix conducting at least 73 bitcoin transactions worth over \$2,000 directly with Welcome to Video. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transaction.

iv. Additional Illicit Proceeds

54. FinCEN observed Helix accepting and transmitting convertible virtual currency for wallets containing the proceeds of various acts of cybercrime. FinCEN traced convertible virtual currencies passing through Helix from these cybercriminal wallets holding value from large scale hacks, account takeovers, criminal organizations and businesses. Many of these transactions contained values greater than or cumulative to \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file a SAR on these transactions.

33. "South Korean National and Hundreds of Others Charged Worldwide in the Takedown of the Largest Darknet Child Pornography Website, Which was Funded by Bitcoin," Department of Justice, Oct. 16, 2019, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/south-korean-national-and-hundreds-others-charged-worldwide-takedown-largest-darknet-child>.

55. **BTC-e.** BTC-e was an unregistered exchanger of convertible virtual currencies that operated from 2011 to July 27, 2017, before it was shut down by a coordinated U.S. government action for alleged money laundering and operating as an unlicensed money transmitter.³⁴ Concurrently, FinCEN assessed a \$110 million dollar civil money penalty against BTC-e and a \$12 million dollar civil money penalty against one of its operators, Alexander Vinnik, for failing to register as a money services business, failing to maintain an AML program, and for facilitating millions of dollars of suspicious transactions without filing a SAR.³⁵ FinCEN observed Helix conducting 1,723 direct bitcoin transactions worth over \$904,637 with BTC-e. At least 107 of these direct transactions were for amounts over \$2,000. Mr. Harmon failed to file SARs on these transactions.

34. *United States v. BTC-e a/k/a Canton Business Corporation and Alexander Vinnik*, CR 16-00227 SI (N.D. CA. Jan. 17, 2017).

35. *In the matter of BTC-e a/k/a Canton Business Corporation and Alexander Vinnik*, Assessment of Civil Money Penalty Number 2017-03, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, July 27, 2017.