January 2026 U.S. Tariff Roundup: Developments and Opportunities
President Trump's trade agenda continues to advance and disrupt in the face of judicial and international scrutiny, prompting importers to seek ways to minimize expenses and risk. Here's what you need to know to catch up on, and respond to, the ever-changing tariff landscape.
Status of the IEEPA Tariff and Duty Refund Cases
As we have advised, in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, the U.S. Supreme Court is weighing the President's authority to impose tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1702. To date, the President has claimed power under IEEPA to impose "trafficking" tariffs on goods from Canada, Mexico, and China on account of their alleged neglect of fentanyl smuggling or illegal immigration; "reciprocal" tariffs on nearly all countries intending to balance trade deficits; and country-specific primary tariffs on Brazil and secondary tariffs on India in response to the prosecution of a former president and the importation of Russian oil during the war in Ukraine, respectively. Two lower courts held that IEEPA does not authorize the trafficking or reciprocal tariffs, with one of those courts extending the holding to any IEEPA-based tariff, and the Supreme Court appeared skeptical of the President's reliance on the statute at oral argument on November 5, 2025.
Anticipating that the Supreme Court will affirm, as of this writing importers seeking refunds of IEEPA duties paid have filed nearly 2,000 protective cases against the Government in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), all of which have been stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision. In one of those cases, AGS Co. Automotive Solutions v. CBP, the Government itself recognized, and the CIT confirmed in a January 14, 2026 paperless order, that the CIT has jurisdiction and authority to order refunds of any and all IEEPA duties if the Supreme Court holds the trafficking and reciprocal tariffs unlawful—at least for cases timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) before a Supreme Court ruling. The CIT had already explained that until the Supreme Court rules, administrative protest remedies are unavailable to claimants, but did not address the options for relief thereafter.
Our advice regarding protecting IEEPA duty refund rights continues to be that by filing a case before the Supreme Court rules, importers of record that have paid IEEPA duties can best reduce both the risk of losing those rights and the delay in receiving those refunds if they are entitled to refunds following the ruling. There is still time to file, as your authors did in January, since the next known Supreme Court opinion release date as of now will not be until February 20. Readers should be aware that to secure refunds, whether through court action or otherwise, they must be registered as of February 6 to accept payments electronically, pursuant to U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) January 2 interim final rule. To receive refunds, all parties must, if they have not already done so, establish an Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) account and complete an ACH Refund application, absent a waiver, as CBP explains.
Tariffs Are Here to Stay No Matter What
A Supreme Court holding that IEEPA does not or cannot authorize tariffs would blunt a heavily used tool of President Trump, namely the ability to impose tariffs quickly as an instrument of foreign policy or leverage in trade negotiations. In January 2026 alone, President Trump has threatened in six instances to impose additional primary or secondary tariffs that do or would likely claim authority under IEEPA in order to take immediate effect. These include tariffs on goods of any country that sells or provides oil to Cuba (for which he declared a national emergency by executive order on January 29) or is "doing business with" Iran; certain Canadian goods both for refusing to certify certain American aircraft and pursuing a trade deal with China; French wines after France rejected an invitation to join the Board of Peace; and goods of the United Kingdom, Norway, and several European Union countries in response to their opposition to a proposed takeover of Greenland. None of these threats have yet been carried out, but they already appear to have influenced the behavior of some target countries nonetheless. Any threats of imposing IEEPA tariffs would, however, be futile if the Supreme Court rules against the Administration.
That being said, as we have also advised, the President's tariff toolbox is not limited to IEEPA, but contains other, more circumscribed statutes that he has used or his Administration has signaled an intention to use to achieve similar results if IEEPA is found to have been unlawfully employed to impose tariffs. Also available to the President are Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2132, and Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, id. § 1338, whereby he can impose, respectively, a tariff of up to 15% on imports for up to 150 days to address a trade deficit or currency depreciation or a tariff of up to 50% on goods of a specific country that discriminates against U.S. commerce. Relatedly, President Trump reportedly has been considering implementing an import licensing scheme based upon IEEPA in lieu of certain tariffs. The President has not taken these actions before but, like the IEEPA tariffs if upheld, none would require advance notice.
To date, however, President Trump has frequently deployed tariffs under both Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1862, and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, id. § 2411. While these statutes require administrative investigations finding a national security threat or unfair foreign trade practice, respectively, as a condition precedent to imposing tariffs, there is no limit to the tariffs authorized and the courts in recent decisions have given the President great leeway to modify them once imposed. Indeed, as a matter of policy the Administration has included exemptions from or discounts on standing Section 232 (and IEEPA) tariffs for certain countries as part of various "trade and security agreements" it has negotiated. And in the Section 301 matter regarding China's intellectual property practices that resulted in additional duties on most Chinese goods since President Trump's first term, the tariffs were implemented in multiple tranches over time as retaliatory measures. Finally, Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2132, allows the President to impose tariffs on a specific article after a finding of injury to that domestic industry, which he has done regarding washing machines and solar panels.
Trade Deals, Section 232, and Section 301
Recent trade deals show the flexibility of Section 232, in addition to IEEPA, to achieve the President's trade goals. On December 4, 2025, the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative's (USTR) office revealed modifications for the additional rates on South Korean goods to implement the previously announced deal, following up on December 18 with changes regarding Switzerland and Liechtenstein. (Also note that on January 26, 2026, President Trump threatened via social media to increase tariffs on goods from South Korea based upon its legislature's failure to enact "our Historic Trade Agreement.") On January 15, 2026, Commerce also announced a deal with Taiwan, which has yet to be implemented. The reciprocal tariffs for the four countries were or will be reduced to 15%, minus the most-favored-nation (MFN) rate, reflecting previous deals made with the European Union and Japan. The Section 232 rates for Korean and Taiwanese automobiles and parts, and wood derivatives, were or will be cut to the same level. Civil aircraft and parts from these countries are or will be exempt from reciprocal tariffs (and from Section 232 metal tariffs if Korean), as are certain unavailable natural resources and generic pharmaceuticals and ingredients from all but Korea, and certain Swiss and Liechtenstein agricultural goods.
The changes for South Korea, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein were made effective retroactively to November 14, 2025 (November 1 for Korean automobiles and parts), meaning any importer that paid now-reduced or eliminated tariffs after that date is eligible to apply for a refund based upon the entry's liquidation status. Be on the lookout for a similar opportunity for goods from Taiwan, as well as Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, and Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala, with respect to all of which countries the USTR announced agreements or framework agreements as early as October and November 2025, respectively, that would yield reductions in or the elimination of reciprocal rates once implemented. Similarly, also on November 14, Executive Order 14360 exempted certain agricultural products retroactive to the previous day. Of course, if the Supreme Court finds that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs, all reciprocal (but not Section 232) duties will be refundable.
Since we last reported on Section 232 developments, one action has been modified, and two more investigations have been completed. First, on December 31, 2025, Proclamation 11000 postponed for one year an increase in the 25% rate on upholstered furniture, kitchen cabinets, and vanities scheduled to take effect the next day. Second, on January 14, 2026, the President agreed to two findings of a national security threat. In the critical minerals investigation, the President held off on tariffs—for now—deciding to begin with negotiations, according to Proclamation 11001. In the semiconductor investigation, however, Proclamation 11002 imposed a 25% duty rate, effective January 15, on a narrow swath of advanced computing chips that are destined for foreign markets or do "not contribute to the buildout of the United States technology supply chain and the strengthening of domestic manufacturing capacity for derivatives of semiconductors." While the exempted products explicitly include those for use in U.S. data centers and in certain other domestic applications, the Secretary of Commerce is given authority to exempt more products on this basis and to develop an end-use certification requirement. Products covered by the Section 232 semiconductor tariff are not subject to other Section 232 or non-China-trafficking IEEPA tariffs, no drawback is permitted, and as usual products ineligible for "domestic status" admission to a foreign trade zone (FTZ) must be admitted under "privileged foreign status."
The Section 301 front has also evolved. On November 26, 2025, in the Chinese intellectual property matter, the USTR extended the 178 outstanding product exclusions until November 10, 2026. However, on December 10, the USTR announced that it will impose a phased-in tariff on most Nicaraguan goods in response to its determination that the government's labor practices are unreasonable and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. Beginning January 1, 2027, any Nicaraguan import that does not originate under the Dominican Republic–Central America–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) will be subject to a 10% tariff, increasing to 15% in 2028. And on December 23, the USTR concluded the investigation into Chinese targeting of the semiconductor industry, finding unreasonable and harmful government activity in the sector and determining to impose tariffs on Chinese semiconductors beginning June 23, 2027, at a rate to be announced.
How to Minimize Exposure in This Trade Environment
In such a volatile trade environment with potentially increasing duty (and penalty) exposure, importers should look to different methods to save money, maximize compliance, and minimize risk. We noted above the potential IEEPA duty refunds after the Supreme Court rules in Learning Resources, other current or likely forthcoming refunds as a result of retroactively effective trade deals, extended Section 301 Chinese product exclusions, and qualifying Nicaraguan goods under DR-CAFTA. However, there are other strategies to consider. For example, sourcing changes can affect an import's country of origin, and manufacturing changes can affect its tariff classification, either of which may subject it to a lower additional tariff rate based on the terms of the various trade deals. Implementing a first-sale program if appropriate or identifying expenses that can be lawfully deducted from dutiable value will reduce the basis. The Administration has made clear that even if the Supreme Court affirms, it will use all the non-IEEPA tariff tools at its disposal quickly to continue to advance its agenda, so the nimblest importers will be the most successful.
Companies should also consider reviewing or creating a customs compliance plan and run any procedures or practices by counsel to be confident in their level of risk. The expansion of trade fraud enforcement efforts on which we have reported has resulted in larger False Claims Act-related recoveries, including a record $54.4 million settlement with a distributor of Chinese tungsten carbide products that allegedly transshipped the product to evade paying Section 301 duties; and criminal charges, including a guilty plea to conspiracy to smuggle goods into the United States by the COO of a global plastic resin distributor who instructed subordinates to misrepresent data to avoid paying Section 301 duties. On January 8, 2026, the Administration announced a plan to create a new Department of Justice (DOJ) division for national fraud enforcement led by an assistant attorney general who—unusual for the DOJ—would report directly to the White House rather than the Attorney General and who may also pursue customs and tariff fraud.
DWT's experienced International Trade, Investment & National Security team can guide your company through these developments and help you to take advantage of the opportunities and avoid the pitfalls they present. Please contact the authors if you have any questions or need assistance.